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ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BILANZICH REQUIRES 
A REMAND ON THE ISSUE OF 4TTORNEY FEES 
This Court's decision in Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041 (Utah 
2007), thoroughly upended the analytic regime applied by the lower court and compels an 
award of attorney fees to Defendants. Simply put, Bilanzich holds that, "Utah Code 
section 78-27-56.5 grants the district court discretion to award attorney fees and costs to a 
prevailing party if the writing that forms the basis of the lawsuit provides attorney fees 
for at least one party." 2007 UT 26, ^ 1. There is no question that: a) Defendants were 
the prevailing party below, having had all counts dismissed (R. 596-598, Plaintiffs. 
Addendum ("PI. Add."). 2; R. 703-07, PL Add. 3; 2277-2279, PL Add. 7; R. 3733-3738, 
PL Add. 8; R. 3999-4002, PL Add. 10); and b) that the parties' written contract clearly 
provided attorney fees for at least one party. (R. 426, PL Add. 6). 
In light of Bilanzich, it is of no moment that the fee-shifting provision of the 
contract at issue used the language of "non-defaulting" party rather than "prevailing" 
party. Rather, Bilanzich instructs that: 
[T]he plain language of Utah Code section 78-27-56.5 
provides that a court may award costs and attorney fees to a 
prevailing party in a civil action if two main conditions are 
met. First, the civil action must be "based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing." And 
second, "the provisions of the promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing" must "allow at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees." 
Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, Tf 14. Here, it is plain that Plaintiff sued on a written contract that 
clearly allowed at least one party to recover attorney's fees. Thus, the trial court's focus 
on the distinction between a "non-defaulting" party and a "prevailing" party is no longer 
meaningful after Bilanzich} In recognizing that trial courts "should award fees liberally 
under Utah Code section 78-27-56.5," Bilanzich further directed that trial courts should 
"also apply common sense principles in determining the prevailing party, if any." Id. at f^ 
20 (emphasis added). It is simply indisputable that Defendants, having obtained 
judgment on every count in the First Amended Complaint, were the prevailing parties in 
this action. 
Plaintiffs efforts to circumvent the expansive fee-shifting analysis set out in 
Bilanzich are easily exposed and provide no basis to affirm the trial court's ruling. First, 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to move for attorney fees pursuant to Section 78-
27-56.5 below and, therefore, cannot do so now. (Plaintiffs Reply Brief and Response to 
Cross Appeal ("PL's Br.") at 27). Plaintiff misses the point, however, in two respects. 
First, Defendants are not seeking attorney fees "pursuant to" the Utah statute-they are 
1
 Further to the point, Plaintiff contended that Defendants breached Plaintiffs 
employment agreement by, among other things, terminating his employment based on 
false allegations of unsatisfactory job performance and intentionally breaching the 
promises and representations Defendants made to Plaintiff. (R. 74-77). Plaintiff sought 
not only damages for Defendants' alleged breach of contract and related claims, but also 
attorney fees. (R. 80 J^ 70). Had Plaintiff prevailed, he would certainly have claimed-
and would likely have been entitled to-attorney fees under the employment contract, 
maintaining that Defendants had defaulted in their obligations to honor the terms of the 
contract and their alleged representations related thereto. Plaintiffs argument in his 
responsive brief that he did not sue Defendants for "defaulting" under the contract 
engages in the type of word parsing that Bilanzich rejects. Even employing the trial 
court's definition of the term "default"-"the omission or failure to perform a legal or 
contractual duty," (R. 4434)-had Plaintiff prevailed he would surely have been a "non-
defaulting" party. Once it is clear that the contract provides for the recovery of attorney 
fees and costs by at least one party, Bilanzich confirms that any prevailing party is 
entitled to such fees and costs. 
2 
seeking fees pursuant to the written contract between the parties. Second, the Utah 
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Section 78-27-56.5 was rendered after the 
parties had briefed the issue of attorney fees before the trial court. Bilanzich* § broad 
explication of Section 78-27-56.5 supplies further authority for the trial court to award 
fees where otherwise provided for in a written contract. 
Plaintiffs suggestion that Section 78-27-56.5 is inapplicable because Defendants 
"had an equal right to fees under Section 7.3 of the SWC Agreement" sets the very trap 
Bilanzich prohibits. PL's Br. at 27 n. 28. First, Section 78-27-56.5 applies where a 
written contract allows "at least one party to recovery attorney's fees." Thus, the 
provision is applicable where a contract provides for attorney's fees to more than one 
party. Second, had Plaintiff prevailed on his contract and related claims, he would have 
effectively established that Defendants had defaulted on their contractual obligations. 
Where the opposite occurred, however, and Defendants prevailed, Defendants did not 
need to establish that Plaintiff had himself defaulted on his contractual duties in order to 
be entitled to attorney's fees. Were that the case, the very asymmetric outcome that 
Bilanzich rejected (if Plaintiff prevails he is entitled to fees, but if Defendants prevail 
they are not) would hold sway. 
2
 Section 78-27-56.5 provides that, "A court may award costs and attorney's fees to 
either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written 
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover 
attorney's fees." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 (emphasis added). 
Nor is Plaintiff accurate in suggesting that the trial court simply exercised its discretion 
in denying Defendants their attorney fees. Rather, the trial court employed an analysis 
3 
Finally, Plaintiffs argument that attorney fees may not be awarded because 
Defendant SWC's "unilateral termination of the SWC Agreement on May 12, 2000, 
terminated all provisions of the Agreement, including the attorney fee and cost provision 
in Section 7.3" cannot be taken seriously in the aftermath of Bilanzich. PL's Br. at 28. In 
Bilanzich, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's reliance on the common law 
rule that a party may not '" avoid [a] contract and, at the same time, claim the benefit of 
the provision for attorney fees,'" and held that Section 78-27-56.5 allows an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to a contract even where a party successfully claims the same 
contract is unenforceable due to the failure of a condition precedent. 2007 UT 26, fflf 8, 
23. In the present case, there is not even a question of the contract's enforceability; 
rather, Defendants merely terminated the employment of Plaintiff who was an at-will 
employee. Under Bilanzich, however, even if the contract itself were deemed 
unenforceable (which it was not), the attorney fee provision would nonetheless survive. 
II. BILANZICH COMPELS A REMAND ON THE ISSUE OF COSTS; IN 
ADDITION, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS UNDER 
RULE 54(D) 
Plaintiff conspicuously ignores the dispositive impact of Bilanzich on the issue of 
costs. For the reasons set forth in Section I above, Bilanzich's directive with respect to 
Section 78-27-56.5 is equally applicable with regard to all of Defendants' costs incurred 
in successfully defending all of Plaintiffs claims. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 
(referring to costs and attorney's fees). This would permit the recovery of all of 
that is inconsistent with the later decision in Bilanzich, thereby requiring remand for 
proper evaluation. 
4 
Defendants' costs, not simply those provided under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), 
including the expert fees Defendants incurred in rebutting Plaintiffs expert's damages 
model which exceeded $12 million. 
With regard to Defendants' application for deposition costs under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(d), Plaintiff attempts to mask the deficiencies of the trial court's 
decision simply by restating that the governing standard is abuse of discretion. {See Pi's 
Br. at 29). Plaintiff fails entirely to justify the unsubstantiated conclusions on which the 
trial court relied in denying deposition costs. First, the trial court's ruling that "the case 
was decided on legal grounds not factual issues" (R. 4457), is misleading in its purported 
support for the finding that the length of Plaintiffs deposition was inessential for the 
development of Defendants' case. To the contrary, uncovering the details of Plaintiff s 
claims regarding the Defendants' alleged tortuous interference, defamation, and 
fraudulent inducement claims was critical in exposing the legal deficiencies in Plaintiffs 
various causes of action. For example, the trial court's decision to grant summary 
judgment on Count V (tortuous interference and defamation) was based on the absence of 
facts supporting these claims. (R. 3733-3738). 
Second, even if the trial court concluded that it was not essential to have devoted 
the entire amount of time that Defendants did to Plaintiffs deposition, this does not 
support the trial court's ruling that there was "no method to parse out what portion may 
have been essential from the overall claim. . . ." (R. 4457). This is especially the case 
where the trial court did not even offer Defendants an opportunity to make such a 
showing. 
5 
Finally, the trial court literally ignored the need for Defendants to participate in the 
depositions scheduled by Plaintiff. To the extent that Plaintiff determined that these 
witnesses had information supporting the claims in the First Amended Complaint, it was 
imperative that Defendants attend these depositions and pose questions to the witnesses. 
There is no basis to deny Defendants' costs in connection with the transcripts of these 
deponents. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the trial court's decision denying Defendants their costs and attorney fees and 
grant Defendants their costs and fees incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 2008. 
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